What Does It Mean When We Refer to Works of Art Being Representational?

Signs that stand in for and have the identify of something else

Representation is the use of signs that stand in for and take the identify of something else.^[1] Information technology is through representation that people organize the world and reality through the act of naming its elements.^[1] Signs are arranged in order to form semantic constructions and express relations.^[1]

For many philosophers, both ancient and modern, human being is regarded as the "representational beast" or beast symbolicum, the creature whose distinct character is the creation and the manipulation of signs – things that "stand for" or "have the identify of" something else.^[1]

Representation has been associated with aesthetics (art) and semiotics (signs). Mitchell says "representation is an extremely rubberband notion, which extends all the way from a stone representing a man to a novel representing the twenty-four hours in the life of several Dubliners".^[one]

The term 'representation' carries a range of meanings and interpretations. In literary theory, 'representation' is unremarkably defined in iii means.

1. To look similar or resemble
2. To stand in for something or someone
3. To nowadays a second time; to re-nowadays^[two]

The reflection on representation began with early literary theory in the ideas of Plato and Aristotle, and has evolved into a significant component of linguistic communication, Saussurian and communication studies.^[2]

Defining representation [edit]

To represent is "to bring to mind by description," also "to symbolize, to exist the apotheosis of;" from representer (12c.), from L. repraesentare, from re-, intensive prefix, + praesentare "to present," lit. "to place before".^{[ original research? ]}

A representation is a blazon of recording in which the sensory information about a concrete object is described in a medium. The caste to which an creative representation resembles the object it represents is a role of resolution and does not affect the denotation of the give-and-take. For example, both the Mona Lisa and a child's crayon drawing of Lisa del Giocondo would be considered representational, and any preference for 1 over the other would demand to exist understood as a affair of aesthetics.^{[ commendation needed ]}

History [edit]

Greek theatrical masks depicted in Hadrians Villa mosaic

Since ancient times representation has played a central role in agreement literature, aesthetics and semiotics. Plato and Aristotle are key figures in early literary theory who considered literature every bit simply ane form of representation.^[3] Aristotle for instance, considered each style of representation, verbal, visual or musical, as being natural to human being beings.^[4] Therefore, what distinguishes humans from other animals is their ability to create and manipulate signs.^[v] Aristotle deemed mimesis equally natural to homo, therefore considered representations as necessary for people's learning and being in the world.^[4]

Plato, in contrast, looked upon representation with more circumspection. He recognised that literature is a representation of life, yet as well believed that representations intervene between the viewer and the existent. This creates worlds of illusion leading one away from the "existent things".^[vi] Plato thus believed that representation needs to be controlled and monitored due to the possible dangers of fostering hating emotions or the imitation of evil.^[5]

Aristotle went on to say it was a definitively human activeness.^[1] From childhood human being has an instinct for representation, and in this respect man differs from the other animals that he is far more imitative and learns his first lessons though imitating things.^[1] Aristotle discusses representation in three ways—

1. The object: The symbol being represented.
2. Mode: The way the symbol is represented.
3. Means: The material that is used to represent it.

The means of literary representation is language. An important part of representation is the relationship between what the material and what it represents. The questions arising from this are, "A stone may stand for a man only how? And by what and by what agreement, does this understanding of the representation occur?"^[1]

One apprehends reality only through representations of reality, through texts, discourses, images: there is no such thing as direct or unmediated admission to reality. Just because one can see reality merely through representation it does not follow that i does not see reality at all... Reality is ever more than all-encompassing and complicated than whatever system of representation can comprehend, and we always sense that this is so-representation never "gets" reality, which is why human history has produced so many and changing ways of trying to go it.^[7]

Consequently, throughout the history of human civilisation, people accept become dissatisfied with language's ability to limited reality and equally a issue accept developed new modes of representation. Information technology is necessary to construct new ways of seeing reality, as people only know reality through representation.^[7] From this arises the contrasting and alternate theories and representational modes of abstraction, realism and modernism, to proper noun a few.

Contemporary ideas about representation [edit]

It is from Plato'due south circumspection that in the modern era many are aware of political and ideological issues and the influences of representations. It is impossible to divorce representations from culture and the society that produces them. In the contemporary globe there exist restrictions on bailiwick matter, limiting the kinds of representational signs allowed to be employed, as well equally boundaries that limit the audition or viewers of particular representations. In motility picture rating systems, M and R rated films are an case of such restrictions, highlighting likewise society's attempt to restrict and modify representations to promote a certain set of ideologies and values. Despite these restrictions, representations still have the ability to have on a life of their ain once in the public sphere, and can not exist given a definitive or concrete meaning; as there will e'er exist a gap between intention and realization, original and copy.^[5]

Consequently, for each of the higher up definitions in that location exists a process of communication and bulletin sending and receiving. In such a organisation of advice and representations information technology is inevitable that potential problems may arise; misunderstandings, errors, and falsehoods. The accuracy of the representations can past no means be guaranteed, as they operate in a arrangement of signs that can never work in isolation from other signs or cultural factors. For instance, the interpretation and reading of representations function in the context of a body of rules for interpreting, and inside a order many of these codes or conventions are informally agreed upon and have been established over a number of years. Such understandings however, are non gear up in stone and may alter betwixt times, places, peoples and contexts. How though, does this 'understanding' or agreement of representation occur? It has generally been agreed by semioticians that representational relationships can exist categorised into three distinct headings: icon, symbol and alphabetize.^[5]

For instance objects and people exercise not have a constant significant, but their meanings are fashioned past humans in the context of their culture, equally they have the power to make things mean or signify something.^[vi] Viewing representation in such a style focuses on understanding how linguistic communication and systems of knowledge production piece of work to create and broadcast meanings. Representation is only the process in which such meanings are constructed.^[six] In much the aforementioned style as the mail service-structuralists, this approach to representation considers it as something larger than whatever 1 single representation. A similar perspective is viewing representation as part of a larger field, as Mitchell, proverb, "…representation (in retentiveness, in verbal descriptions, in images) not only 'mediates' our knowledge (of slavery and of many other things), but obstructs, fragments, and negates that knowledge"^[viii] and proposes a move away from the perspective that representations are but "objects representing", towards a focus on the relationships and processes through which representations are produced, valued, viewed and exchanged.

Peirce and representation [edit]

Charles Sanders Peirce (1839–1914) was an innovative and achieved logician, mathematician, and scientist, and founded philosophical pragmatism. Peirce's fundamental ideas were focused on logic and representation.

Semiotics and logic [edit]

Peirce distinguished philosophical logic as logic per se from mathematics of logic. He regarded logic (per se) as function of philosophy, every bit a normative field post-obit esthetics and ethics, as more basic than metaphysics,^[9] and every bit the fine art of devising methods of research.^[10] He argued that, more generally, as inference, "logic is rooted in the social principle", since inference depends on a standpoint that, in a sense, is unlimited.^[11]

Peirce held that logic is formal semiotic,^[12] the formal study of signs in the broadest sense, not merely signs that are artificial, linguistic, or symbolic, just besides signs that are semblances or are indexical such as reactions. He held that "all this universe is perfused with signs, if it is not composed exclusively of signs",^[xiii] along with their representational and inferential relations, interpretable by listen or quasi-mind (any works like a mind despite perhaps not really being one);^[14] the focus here is on sign action in full general, not psychology, linguistics, or social studies).

He argued that, since all idea takes fourth dimension, "all thought is in signs"^[xv] and sign processes ("semiosis") and that the three irreducible elements of semiosis are (ane) the sign (or representamen), (2) the (semiotic) object, the sign's subject affair, which the sign represents and which tin exist anything thinkable—quality, animal fact, or police—and fifty-fifty fictional (Prince Hamlet), and (3) the interpretant (or interpretant sign), which is the sign's meaning or ramification as formed into a kind of idea or effect that is a farther sign, for example, a translation.^[16] Even when a sign represents by a resemblance or factual connection independent of interpretation, the sign is a sign because it is at least potentially interpretable. A sign depends on its object in a way that enables (and, in a sense, determines) interpretation, forming an interpretant which, in turn, depends on the sign and on the object as the sign depends on the object and is thus a farther sign, enabling and determining still further interpretation, further interpretants. That substantially triadic process is logically structured to perpetuate itself and is what defines sign, object, and interpretant.

An object either (i) is immediate to a sign, and that is the object equally represented in the sign, or (two) is a dynamic object, which is the object every bit information technology really is, on which the immediate object is founded. Ordinarily, an object in question, such every bit Hamlet or the planet Neptune, is a special or partial object. A sign's total object is the object's universe of discourse, the totality of things in that world to which one attributes the object. An interpretant is either (1) immediate to a sign, for example a word's usual meaning, a kind of interpretive quality or possibility present in the sign, or (2) dynamic, an bodily interpretant, for example a state of agitation, or (3) final or normal, a question'southward true settlement, which would be reached if thought or inquiry were pushed far enough, a kind of norm or ideal end with which any actual interpretant may, at most, coincide.

Peirce said that, in lodge to know to what a sign refers, the mind needs some sort of feel of the sign's object, feel outside, and collateral to, the given sign or sign system. In that context he spoke of collateral experience, collateral ascertainment, collateral acquaintance, all in much the same terms.^[17] For example, art piece of work can exploit both the richness and the limits of the audition'southward experience; a novelist, in disguising a roman à clef, counts on the typical reader'due south lack of personal experience with the actual individual people portrayed. Then the reader refers the signs and interpretants in a general fashion to an object or objects of the kind that is represented (intentionally or otherwise) by the novel. In all cases, the object (be it a quality or fact or law or even fictional) determines the sign to an interpretant through one'southward collateral experience with the object, collateral experience in which the object is newly found or from which it is recalled, fifty-fifty if it is experience with an object of imagination as called into being by the sign, every bit can happen non but in fiction simply in theories and mathematics, all of which tin involve mental experimentation with the object under specifiable rules and constraints. Through collateral experience even a sign that consists in a hazard semblance of an absent object is determined by that object.

Peirce held that logic has iii principal parts:

1. Speculative grammar,^[xviii] on meaningfulness, conditions for meaning. Study of significatory elements and combinations.
2. Logical critic,^[19] on validity, conditions for truthful representation. Critique of arguments in their various distinct modes.
3. Speculative rhetoric, or methodeutic,^[20] on conditions for determining interpretations. Methodology of enquiry in its mutually interacting modes.

i. Speculative Grammer. Past this, Peirce means discovering relations amid questions of how signs tin be meaningful and of what kinds of signs there are, how they combine, and how some embody or incorporate others. Within this broad area, Peirce developed three interlocked universal trichotomies of signs, depending respectively on (ane) the sign itself, (2) how the sign stands for its object, and (3) how the sign stands for its object to its interpretant. Each trichotomy is divided co-ordinate to the phenomenological category involved: Firstness (quality of feeling, essentially monadic), secondness (reaction or resistance, essentially dyadic), or thirdness (representation or mediation, essentially triadic).^[21]

1. Qualisigns, sinsigns, and legisigns. Every sign is either (qualisign) a quality or possibility, or (sinsign) an bodily private affair, fact, event, country, etc., or (legisign) a norm, habit, rule, law.
2. Icons, indices, and symbols. Every sign refers either (icon) through similarity to its object, or (index) through factual connexion to its object, or (symbol) through interpretive habit or norm of reference to its object.
3. Rhemes, dicisigns, and arguments. Every sign is interpreted either as (rheme) term-like, continuing for its object in respect of quality, or as (dicisign) proffer-like, continuing for its object in respect of fact, or as (argument) argumentative, standing for its object in respect of habit or constabulary. This is the trichotomy of all signs as building blocks of inference.

Lines of articulation classification of signs.
Every sign is:^[22]

	1.		2.		3.
I.	Qualisign	or	Sinsign	or	Legisign
and
Ii.	Icon	or	Alphabetize	or	Symbol
and
III.	Rheme	or	Dicisign	or	Argument

Some (not all) sign classes from different trichotomies intersect each other. For example, a qualisign is always an icon, and is never an index or a symbol. He held that at that place were merely x classes of signs logically definable through those three universal trichotomies.^[23] He idea that at that place were further such universal trichotomies equally well. Too, some signs need other signs in club to be embodied. For case, a legisign (also called a type), such as the word "the," needs to exist embodied in a sinsign (as well called a token), for example an individual instance of the word "the", in club to exist expressed. Another form of combination is attachment or incorporation: an alphabetize may be attached to, or incorporated by, an icon or a symbol.

Peirce called an icon apart from a characterization, legend, or other index attached to it, a "hypoicon", and divided the hypoicon into three classes: (a) the epitome, which depends on a simple quality; (b) the diagram, whose internal relations, mainly dyadic or then taken, represent past analogy the relations in something; and (c) the metaphor, which represents the representative character of a sign by representing a parallelism in something else.^[24] A diagram tin be geometric, or can consist in an array of algebraic expressions, or fifty-fifty in the mutual class "All __ is ___" which is subjectable, like any diagram, to logical or mathematical transformations.

two. Logical critic or Logic Proper. That is how Peirce refers to logic in the everyday sense. Its main objective, for Peirce, is to classify arguments and determine the validity and force of each kind.^[19] He sees three main modes: abductive inference (guessing, inference to a hypothetical explanation); deduction; and consecration. A work of fine art may embody an inference process and be an statement without beingness an explicit argumentation. That is the difference, for example, between almost of State of war and Peace and its last department.

iii. Speculative rhetoric or methodeutic. For Peirce this is the theory of constructive use of signs in investigations, expositions, and applications of truth. Hither Peirce coincides with Morris's notion of pragmatics, in his estimation of this term. He as well called it "methodeutic", in that it is the analysis of the methods used in inquiry.^[20]

Using signs and objects [edit]

Peirce ended that there are three ways in which signs represent objects. They underlie his nigh widely known trichotomy of signs:

• Icon
• Index
• Symbol^[25]

Icon

This term refers to signs that represent by resemblance, such as portraits and some paintings though they can also exist natural or mathematical. Iconicity is contained of actual connexion, even if it occurs considering of actual connection. An icon is or embodies a possibility, insofar as its object need not actually exist. A photograph is regarded every bit an icon because of its resemblance to its object, but is regarded as an index (with icon attached) considering of its actual connectedness to its object. Also, with a portrait painted from life. An icon's resemblance is objective and contained of interpretation, but is relative to some mode of apprehension such as sight. An icon need non exist sensory; anything tin serve as an icon, for case a streamlined statement (itself a complex symbol) is oftentimes used as an icon for an statement (another symbol) bristling with particulars.

Alphabetize

Peirce explains that an index is a sign that compels attention through a connection of fact, oft through cause and upshot. For example, if we see smoke nosotros conclude that it is the consequence of a cause – burn. It is an index if the connection is factual regardless of resemblance or interpretation. Peirce usually considered personal names and demonstratives such equally the give-and-take "this" to be indices, for although equally words they depend on interpretation, they are indices in depending on the requisite factual relation to their individual objects. A personal name has an bodily historical connection, often recorded on a birth certificate, to its named object; the word "this" is like the pointing of a finger.

Symbol

Peirce treats symbols equally habits or norms of reference and pregnant. Symbols can be natural, cultural, or abstract and logical. They depend as signs on how they volition be interpreted, and lack or have lost dependence on resemblance and actual, indexical connection to their represented objects, though the symbol's individual embodiment is an index to your experience of its represented object. Symbols are instantiated by specialized indexical sinsigns. A suggestion, considered apart from its expression in a particular linguistic communication, is already a symbol, but many symbols draw from what is socially accepted and culturally agreed upon. Conventional symbols such every bit "horse" and caballo , which prescribe qualities of sound or appearance for their instances (for example, individual instances of the give-and-take "horse" on the page) are based on what amounts to capricious stipulation.^[5] Such a symbol uses what is already known and accepted within our society to give meaning. This can be both in spoken and written language.

For instance, we tin can call a large metal object with 4 wheels, four doors, an engine and seats a "car" because such a term is agreed upon inside our culture and it allows us to communicate. In much the same fashion, every bit a social club with a common set of understandings regarding language and signs, we can also write the word "machine" and in the context of Australia and other English speaking nations, know what it symbolises and is trying to represent.^[26]

Saussure and representation [edit]

Swiss linguist Ferdinand de Saussure (1857–1913) played a major role in the development of semiotics with his statement that linguistic communication is a system of signs that needs to be understood in order to fully understand the process of linguistics.^[27] The study of semiotics examines the signs and types of representation that humans use to express feelings, ideas, thoughts and ideologies.^[28] Although semiotics is often used in the form of textual analysis information technology also involves the study of representation and the processes involved with representation.

The process of representation is characterised by using signs that we call back mentally or phonetically to comprehend the world.^[29] Saussure says before a human tin use the word "tree" she or he has to envision the mental concept of a tree.

Two things are central to the study of signs:^[30]

1. The signified: a mental concept, and
2. The signifier: the verbal manifestation, the sequence of letters or sounds, the linguistic realisation.

The signifier is the discussion or sound; the signified is the representation.

Saussure points out that signs:

• Are capricious: There is no link between the signifier and the signified
• Are relational: We empathize we take on meaning in relation to other words. Such equally we understand "up" in relation to "downward" or a dog in relation to other animals, such as a cat.
• establish our world – "You cannot become outside of language. We exist inside a arrangement of signs".^[30]

Saussure suggests that the meaning of a sign is capricious, in effect; there is no link betwixt the signifier and the signified.^[31] The signifier is the word or the sound of the word and the signified is the representation of the word or audio. For example, when referring to the term "sister" (signifier) a person from an English speaking country such as Australia, may associate that term as representing someone in their family who is female and built-in to the same parents (signified). An Aboriginal Australian may associate the term "sis" to represent a shut friend that they accept a bond with. This means that the representation of a signifier depends completely upon a person's cultural, linguistic and social background.

Saussure argues that if words or sounds were simply labels for existing things in the world, translation from one language or culture to another would exist easy, it is the fact that this tin exist extremely hard that suggests that words trigger a representation of an object or thought depending on the person that is representing the signifier.^[32] The signified triggered from the representation of a signifier in one particular language do not necessarily represent the same signified in some other language. Even within one detail linguistic communication many words refer to the aforementioned thing merely correspond different people's interpretations of it. A person may refer to a particular place as their "work" whereas someone else represents the same signifier as their "favorite restaurant". This can too be subject to historical changes in both the signifier and the fashion objects are signified.

Saussure claims that an imperative role of all written languages and alphabetic systems is to "represent" spoken language.^[33] Well-nigh languages exercise not have writing systems that represent the phonemic sounds they make. For instance, in English the written alphabetic character "a" represents different phonetic sounds depending on which word it is written in. The letter "a" has a unlike sound in the discussion in each of the following words, "apple", "gate", "margarine" and "beat", therefore, how is a person unaware of the phonemic sounds, able to pronounce the word properly by simply looking at alphabetic spelling. The fashion the give-and-take is represented on paper is not e'er the way the word would be represented phonetically. This leads to common misrepresentations of the phonemic sounds of speech and suggests that the writing organisation does non properly correspond the true nature of the pronunciation of words.

Notes [edit]

1. ^ ^{a b c d e f g h} Mitchell, Due west. 1995, "Representation", in F Lentricchia & T McLaughlin (eds), Critical Terms for Literary Report, 2nd edn, University of Chicago Press, Chicago
2. ^ ^{a b} O'Shaughnessy, K & Stadler J, Media and society: an introduction, third edn, Oxford University Press, South Melbourne, 2005
3. ^ Childers J (ed.), Columbia Dictionary of Modern Literary and Cultural Criticism, Columbia University Printing, New York, 1995
4. ^ ^{a b} <Vukcevich, 1000 2002, "Representation", The University of Chicago, viewed vii Apr 2006
5. ^ ^{a b c d e} Mitchell, Due west, "Representation", in F Lentricchia & T McLaughlin (eds), Disquisitional Terms for Literary Study, University of Chicago Press, Chicago 1990
6. ^ ^{a b c} Hall, S (ed.), Cultural Representations and Signifying Practice, Open Academy Press, London, 1997. ISBN 978-0761954323
7. ^ ^{a b} Dryer 1993, cited in O'Shaughnessy & Stadler 2005
8. ^ Mitchell, Westward, Picture Theory, Academy of Chicago Printing, Chicago, 1994
9. ^ On his classifications, see Peirce, C.South. (1903), CP i.180–202 Eprint Archived 2011-xi-05 at the Wayback Motorcar and (1906) "The Ground of Pragmaticism" in The Essential Peirce two:372–3. For the relevant quotes, meet "Philosophy" and "Logic" at Commens Dictionary of Peirce'southward Terms, Bergman and Paavola, editors, U. of Helsinki.
10. ^ Peirce, C.South., 1882, "Introductory Lecture on the Study of Logic" delivered September 1882, Johns Hopkins University Circulars, vol. 2, no. 19, pp. 11–12, November 1892, Google Volume Search Eprint. Reprinted in Nerveless Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce v. vii, paragraphs 59–76, The Essential Peirce 1:214–214; Writings of Charles S. Peirce four:378–382.
11. ^ Peirce, C.Due south. (1878) "The Doctrine of Chances", Popular Science Monthly, v. 12, pp. 604–615, 1878, reprinted in Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, five. 2, paragraphs 645–668, Writings of Charles S. Peirce 3:276–290, and The Essential Peirce 1:142–154. "...death makes the number of our risks, the number of our inferences, finite, and and then makes their hateful result uncertain. The very thought of probability and of reasoning rests on the assumption that this number is indefinitely slap-up. .... ...logicality inexorably requires that our interests shall non be limited. .... Logic is rooted in the social principle."
12. ^ Peirce, C. S. (written 1902), "MS L75: Logic, Regarded Equally Semeiotic (The Carnegie awarding of 1902): Version one: An Integrated Reconstruction", Joseph Ransdell, ed., Arisbe, see Memoir 12.
13. ^ Peirce, C.South., The Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, v. v, paragraph 448 footnote, from "The Ground of Pragmaticism" in 1906.
14. ^ Run into "Quasi-Mind" at the Commens Dictionary of Peirce'due south Terms, Mats Bergman and Sami Paavola, eds., University of Helsinki.
15. ^ Peirce, C.Southward. (1868), "Questions Concerning Sure Faculties Claimed for Man" (Arisbe Eprint), Periodical of Speculative Philosophy vol. 2, pp. 103–114. Reprinted (Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, v. 5, paragraphs 213–263, the quote is from paragraph 253).
16. ^ For Peirce's definitions of semiosis, sign, representamen, object, interpretant, meet the Commens Dictionary of Peirce's Terms.
17. ^ Ten quotes on collateral observation from Peirce provided by Professor Joseph Ransdell can be viewed here. As well see pp. 404–409 in "Pragmatism" past Peirce in The Essential Peirce v. 2.
18. ^ See "Grammar: Speculative" in Commens Dictionary of Peirce's Terms.
19. ^ ^{a b} See "Critic" in Commens Dictionary of Peirce's Terms.
20. ^ ^{a b} See "Methodeutic" in Commens Dictionary of Peirce's Terms.
21. ^ "Categories, Cenopythagorean Categories", Commens Lexicon of Peirce'due south Terms, Mats Bergman and Sami Paavola, editors, University of Helsinki.
22. ^ Peirce (1903 MS), "Nomenclature and Divisions of Triadic Relations, as Far as They Are Determined", under other titles in Nerveless Papers (CP) 5. 2, paragraphs 233–72, and reprinted under the original title in Essential Peirce (EP) v. 2, pp. 289–99. Also encounter image of MS 339 (August 7, 1904) supplied to peirce-l by Bernard Morand of the Institut Universitaire de Technologie (France), Département Informatique.
23. ^ See Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, v. two, paragraphs 254–263, reprinted in Philosophical Writings of Peirce pp. 115–118, and in The Essential Peirce five. 2, pp. 294–296.
24. ^ On image, diagram, and metaphor, encounter "Hypoicon" in the Commens Lexicon of Peirce's Terms.
25. ^ For Peirce's definitions of icon, index, symbol, and related terms, see the Commens Dictionary of Peirce'southward Terms
26. ^ Dupriez, B, A Dictionary of Literary Devices, Academy of Toronto Printing, Canada, 1991.
27. ^ Culler, J 1976, Saussure, Fontana Modern Masters, Britain, 1976.
28. ^ Ryder, Chiliad, Semiotics: Language and Culture, 2004 viewed six April 2006 meet link below
29. ^ Klarer, M, An Introduction to Literary Studies, Routledge, London, 1998.
30. ^ ^{a b} Barry, P, Beginning Theory: an Introduction to Literary and Cultural Theory, Manchester University Press, Slap-up United kingdom, 2002.
31. ^ Holdcroft 1991 no details
32. ^ Chandler, D, Semiotics for Beginners: Modality and representation, viewed eight Apr 2006
33. ^ Arnason, D, Reference material, 2006, viewed 12 Apr 2006

See as well [edit]

• Aspectism
• Cultural artifact
• Civilization theory
• Figurative art
• Foundation for the Advocacy of Art
• Media influence
• Mimesis
• Painting
• Program music
• Realism (arts)
• Representative realism
• Symbol
• Western painting
• Work of art
• Conceptual art

References [edit]

• Arnason, D, Semiotics: the arrangement of signs (via the Wayback Motorcar)
• Baldick, C, "New historicism", in The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Literary Terms, 1996, viewed 8 Apr 2006 [1]
• Barry, P, Beginning Theory: an Introduction to Literary and Cultural Theory, Manchester University Press, Great U.k., 2002.
• Burch, R 2005, "Charles Sanders Peirce", in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, viewed 24 April 2006 [2].
• Chandler, D, Semiotics for Beginners: Modality and Representation, 2001, viewed 8 April 2006 [3].
• Childers J. (ed.), Columbia Dictionary of Modernistic Literary and Cultural Criticism, Columbia University Press, New York, 1995.
• Curtailed Routledge, Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, Routledge, London, 1999.
• Culler, J., Saussure, Fontana Modern Masters, U.k., 1976.
• Dupriez, B, A Lexicon of Literary Devices, University of Toronto Press, Canada 1991.
• Fuery, P & Mansfield N, Cultural Studies and Critical Theory, Oxford University Press, Australia, 2005. (ISBN 978-0-nineteen-551294-vi)
• Hall, S (ed.), Cultural Representations and Signifying Practise, Open up University Press, London, 1997.
• Holder, D, Saussure – Signs, System, and Arbitrariness, Cambridge, Australia, 1991.
• Lentricchia, F. & McLaughlin,T (eds.), Critical Terms for Literary Written report, University of Chicago Printing, London, 1990.
• Klarer, Thousand, An Introduction to Literary Studies, Routledge, London, 1998.
• Mitchell, W, "Representation", in F Lentricchia & T McLaughlin (eds), Disquisitional Terms for Literary Written report, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1990.
• Mitchell, W, "Representation", in F Lentricchia & T McLaughlin (eds), Disquisitional Terms for Literary Study, second edn, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1995.
• Mitchell, W, Picture Theory, Academy of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1994.
• Moon, B, Literary terms: a Applied Glossary, 2nd edn, Chalkface Press, Cottesloe, 2001.
• Murfin, R & Ray, S.One thousand, The Bedford Glossary of Critical and Literary Terms, Bedford Books, Boston, 1997.
• O'Shaughnessy, One thousand & Stadler J, Media and Society: an Introduction, 3rd edn, Oxford Academy Printing, South Melbourne, 2005. (ISBN 978-0-xix-551402-v)
• Prendergast, C, "Circulating Representations: New Historicism and the Poetics of Civilization", Substance: The Review of Theory and Literary Criticism, no. 28, issue 1, pp. 90–105, 1999, (online Humanities International Consummate)
• Ryder, M, Semiotics: Language and Culture, 2004, viewed six April 2006 [4].
• Shook, J, The Pragmatism Cybrary: Charles Morris, in The Pragmatism Cybrary, 2005, viewed 24 April 2006 [5].
• Vukcevich, G, Representation, The University of Chicago, 2002, viewed seven April 2006.

External links [edit]

• University of Chicago

richardsonnoure1992.blogspot.com

Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Representation_%28arts%29

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